Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Before the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, there was broad agreement among macroeconomists that short-run stabilization was nearly exclusively the province of monetary policy.
The possibility to hit the lower zero bound on nominal interest rates was considered to be a minor issue and even in this unlikely event that it did bind, monetary authorities would have additional tools in place to mitigate adverse shocks. However, in presence of the large adverse shock generated by the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008, central banks sharply reduced their policy interest rates and the constraint imposed by the zero lower bound turned out to be large (Romer 2011) . Because of the magnitude of adverse effects, fiscal policy was rediscovered as a short-term stabilization tool. Therefore, large fiscal programs were launched as an immediate response to the crisis and triggered a large increase in public debt. Furthermore, public debt accelerated further as bailouts became necessary to rescue large parts of the financial sector and governmental revenue shrank due to a sharp economic decline.
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As public debt growth accelerated and economic activity decreased, the rise of serious concerns about the ability of several European states 2 to meet their financial obligations marked the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010. While the ECB took large actions in order to prevent a breakup of the Euro Area and to lower sovereign bond yields, fiscal policy in Europe entered the "age of austerity" (Ortiz/Cummins 2013) . As the Euro Area is still struggling to recover from the recent crises, fiscal consolidation efforts are subjected to large criticism. As fiscal contraction can have strong negative effects on economic activity in the shortrun, it is partly blamed for the weak economic development of the Euro Area. Fears are rising that austerity might be self-defeating in its task to reduce public indebtedness (De Grauwe/Ji 2013). As unemployment is high in large parts of the Euro Area, it might endanger the public support to effectively implement austerity policies and structural reforms. Furthermore, economic development in countries which are undertaking heavy fiscal consolidation has been quite disappointing even compared to original forecasts. In this aspect, it is frequently stated that the effects of austerity have been underestimated, as fiscal multipliers might be larger than normal due to the economic environment.
Regarding the magnitude of fiscal multipliers, economic theory does not provide a clear picture.
Even with regard to the sign, there is no consent among economic theories. While classic Namely the so-called GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) 5 Keynesian and New Keynesian models generally find multipliers to be positive, the effect of fiscal stimulus can be zero or even negative according to several neoclassic models as well as the Ricardian equivalence proposition (Ramey 2011) . Furthermore, the question about the size of fiscal multipliers appears to be even more complicated as additional theoretical considerations as well as empirical evidence suggest that the magnitude of fiscal multipliers might depend on the economic environment (Romer 2011) . Therefore, there might be no single multiplier measuring the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus as its size varies over time as well as across countries (Hernandez de Cos/Moral-Benito 2013).
With respect to the current economic environment, there are several reasons indicating that fiscal multipliers might be higher than in normal times. As nearly all major central banks have reached the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, fiscal stimulus might be a powerful tool to boost aggregate demand as it is accommodated through a fixed zero policy rate . As has been shown theoretically by Christiano et al. (2011) and Woodford (2011) , fiscal multipliers can exceed the value of three in presence of the binding zero bound and therefore can be higher than under normal monetary conditions. 3 As the overall short-term effects of unconventional monetary policies are still on debate, fiscal impulses might be considered as one of the last tools to generate significant short-term effects.
Moreover, the position in the business cycle might strongly affect the impact of fiscal policy on output. The traditional argument stating that fiscal impulses crowd out private spending appears less applicable when output is below potential and capacities in the economy are available (Baum/Koester 2011) . In line with standard Keynesian theory, empirical evidence finds significant differences in sizes of fiscal multipliers between down-and upturns. Baum et al. (2012) find evidence for the G7 countries (except Italy) that fiscal multipliers vary with the business cycle. Auerbach/Gorodnichenko (2012b) generate additional evidence for a large number of OECD countries. Using a regime-switching VAR, Batini et al. (2012) estimate the impact of fiscal adjustment in the United States, Europe and Japan, allowing fiscal multipliers to vary across recessions and booms. The authors find that fiscal multipliers appear to be much larger during recessions than during an expansion. Wieland (2011) is about 1,5 and therefore smaller than suggested by Christiano et al. (2011) and Woodford (2011) .
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A deep recession might lead to even higher multipliers, if a period of economic slack is connected or even caused by high levels of stress in the banking sector. As a result, banks might reduce lending or increase risk premia on interest rates for loans severely constraining a large share of households as well as firms from credit funding. Since financial and banking stress raises the share of credit-constrained agents in the economy, fiscal multipliers might be higher, as consumption and investment are more dependent on current than future income and profits (Eggertson/ Krugman 2012). 5 With regard to the current discussion about austerity in the Euro Area, it has to be highlighted that the level of fiscal debt might also influence the magnitude of the fiscal multiplier. The short-term effects on output of a fiscal consolidation in times of high levels of public debt can be lower, as it reduces the likelihood of strong distortion from large tax increases in the future . Perotti (1999) provides a theoretical model as well as empirical evidence for several countries. 6, 7 Furthermore, if additional fiscal stimuli generate or intensify doubts about public debt sustainability, it will lead to higher private-sector borrowing costs as well as higher interest payments of the sovereign (Abbas et al. 2013) . High levels of debt can therefore decrease the effectiveness of fiscal expansion and fiscal stimuli might even be counterproductive.
According to the growing evidence on the regime-dependency of fiscal multipliers the current economic environment overall hints at larger-than-usual fiscal multipliers. With regard to the discrepancy between growth forecasts and actual growth rates for the Euro Area in recent years, it can be argued that growth forecasts have underestimated the magnitude of fiscal multipliers and therefore the short-term effects of austerity in the Euro Area. In this regard, the study of Blanchard/Leigh (2012) attracted considerable attention. The authors come to the conclusion that austerity has larger effects than previously forecasted as fiscal multipliers have been underestimated in advanced economies. Their results indicate that this has especially been the case for 2011 and to a lesser extent for the following years. However, the European Comission (2012) and Ikonen et al. (2013) come to different conclusions. Both sources find evidence that "it was the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis and the associated tightening of credit conditions that depressed domestic demand and ultimately caused the observed growth shortfall in several euro area countries" (Ikonen et al. 2013) . Therefore, the current strand of empirical 5 find evidence that the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus is higher at times of a financial crisis. 6 Bertola/Drazen (1993) propose a theoretical model with similar predictions.
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Further evidence is provided by Ilzetzki et al. (2010) and . 7 literature suggests two explanations. While Blanchard/Leigh (2013) focus on the effects of austerity and higher-than-usual fiscal multipliers, EC (2012) and Ikonen et al. (2013) explain the discrepancy between forecast and actual growth as a result of fiscal vulnerabilities leading to the sovereign debt crisis.
The paper at hand closely follows the approach presented by Blanchard/Leigh (2013) to estimate whether the effectiveness of fiscal contraction has been underestimates in times of austerity. Focusing mainly on European countries for the time period between 2010 and 2013, we conduct cross section as well as fixed effect panel estimation and include several additional variables in order to check for robustness of our estimations.
Our findings can be summarized as follows: We find that large evidence of an underestimation of fiscal multipliers by forecasters can only be found for 2011 in both the IMF and EC data. Therefore, our results indicate that forecasts have underestimated the effects of fiscal contraction on GDP growth at least for 2011. With regard to the year 2010, we find that evidence is pretty scarce as the relevant coefficient is not robust with regard to the inclusion of additional variables which account for sovereign debt developments. For 2012 and 2013, we find no evidence that the effectiveness of fiscal consolidation has been underestimated by IMF forecasts.
We do, however, find some evidence that the forecasters of the European Commission have overestimated the effect of fiscal contraction on GDP growth in the year 2012, possibly as a reaction to the underestimation in 2011. Therefore, we conclude that forecasts have not repeatedly underestimated the magnitude of fiscal multipliers.
In section 2 we start by describing the economic framework as well as our dataset. Afterwards, we report the results of our cross section analysis in section 3. The findings of our panel fixedeffects estimations are presented in section 4. Section 5 concludes with a final evaluation of our findings.
Estimation Framework and Dataset
As mentioned in the introduction, this paper closely follows the estimation framework of Blanchard/Leigh (2013) . The estimation approach comprises a simple regression of forecast growth error for real GDP in years and 1 on fiscal consolidation forecasts for and 1 made at the beginning of year . As fiscal policy can be expected to have lagged effects on output, two-year intervals are used. We obtain the following equation: In order to check for robustness of our estimations, we include additional variables. Because the fiscal consolidation forecast is the sole regressor variable in our baseline specification, there is a possibility that a relevant variable is omitted and β is biased. Therefore, we include additional variables in order to account specifically for governmental debt developments as well as stress in the banking sector. Thereby, we especially include variables "that could plausibly have triggered both planned fiscal consolidation and lower-than-expected growth. The omission of such variables could bias the analysis toward finding that fiscal multipliers were larger than assumed" (Blanchard/Leigh 2013) . We include the following variables in order to check for robustness: government effectiveness, political stability, unemployment, the external debt to 8 We use "cyclically adjusted net lending/ borrowing as percentage of GDP" to model fiscal spending when using the data from the European Comission.
GDP ratio, 10-year sovereign yields, the year-on-year change in 10-year sovereign yields, 5-year-sovereign credit default swap (CDS), government net debt, government gross debt, average 5-year-bank CDS spread, stock market volatility, the Net International Investment Position (NIIP) and current account. With regard to the current economic environment, we especially include variables which measure the perception of government risk as well as financial market stress.
Regarding the addition of variables as robustness tests, it is important to highlight that these variables are only allowed to include information which were accessible at the time forecasts were made. Therefore, it is not possible to simply use ex-post data in order to perform a robustness tests as these information were not in the information set of the forecaster. In accordance with the framework of Blanchard/Leigh (2013), we use real-time data for variables which are susceptible to revision and only utilize latest information which were available at times forecasts were made.
The two stability indices (political stability and government effectiveness) are taken from the World Banks World Wide Governance Indicators (WGI). The indicators range from -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performances. Unemployment rates, current account, government gross and net debt 9 for all countries are taken from the WEO database. The external debt data is mainly taken from the Eurostat database.
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Values for the USA and Iceland are constructed by own calculations using the data from the US treasury and Statistics Iceland. As we could not find satisfactory data for Norway it is excluded from this particular test for robustness.
Both the data for the bank CDS 11 and sovereign CDS spreads are taken from the Bloomberg LP database. The sovereign yields represent long-term (10-years) rates and are taken from Thomson Reuters Datastream. We use data from the first quarter of each year. Furthermore, we measured yearly stock market volatility as standard deviations of log returns. The NIIP is taken directly from the ECFIN's database. Real-time data of government net debt is still scarce. No data is available for the following countries: Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Czech Republic and Romania.
The values for 2013 are calculated as the mean of quarters 1 to 3 for Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal since the last quarter was missing in the Eurostat database.
Our data encompasses 27 countries with a focus on European economies.
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To differentiate our results we estimate our models with 6 different subgroups each of which is defined by their potentially different fiscal multipliers. Our subgroups are: 3. Cross Section Analysis 3.1 Main Findings Table 1 presents the results of the cross section analysis for the years 2010 to 2013 when using the IMF data. It includes results of different groups of countries in order to model the sensitivity to changes in the economies included in the sample. Apart from simple OLS regressions, robust and quantile regressions were used in order to generate (more) outlier-resistant estimates and to check whether potential outliers affect the OLS regressions. The reported coefficients measure the effect of a change in the structural fiscal balance as a percent of potential GDP on the growth forecast error. The estimates of the constant terms are not reported as its economic interpretation is not eminent for the topic at hand.
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Starting with the results of our country group "Total", we find a strong and significant negative relation between fiscal consolidation forecast and growth forecast for 2011. Using OLS, the estimated coefficient, β, is -1,155 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This result 12 The 27 countries are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. implies that the fiscal multiplier has been underestimated by nearly 1,2. Furthermore, this estimate appears to be quite robust to outliers as the additional regressions generate similar results. With respect to the sensitivity of the results to changes in the economies included in the sample, we start by excluding the USA from our sample in order to focus on European countries. For 2013, we find deviations from the results of the estimation for country group "Total" as the absolute values of β increase and are at least significant to the 10% level. However, the results for the other years are in line with the baseline estimations.
As there are still large differences between European Countries with regard to the economic development, we check whether developments in emerging countries are influencing the baseline results. Therefore, we exclude the following emerging economies from the sample: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Romania. While the results indicate no evidence for 2010 and 2012, the β-coefficients for 2011 remain highly significant and of large magnitude ( 1,062).
Next, we focus on the Euro Area as austerity has been a major subject in response to the sovereign debt crisis. We find no evidence that fiscal multipliers have been underestimated for the years 2010 and 2012. Compared to the baseline results, the absolute value of the β-coefficient is again slightly above 1 ( 1,133) for 2011 and is highly significant. For 2013, the evidence once again becomes weaker as the coefficient is barely significant at the 10% level.
Next, we test whether forecasts of countries with IMF programs cause the results of the baseline estimations. Therefore, we exclude Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Romania from the sample. For this sample, we find no significant evidence of an underestimation of the fiscal multiplier for 2010, 2012 and 2013. However, the β-estimations for 2011 once again are significant and large in magnitude ( 1,022).
As mentioned in the introduction, there is theoretical evidence that the fiscal multiplier is large if the nominal interest rate hits the zero lower bound. Therefore, the next subgroup includes only countries which can be considered to be near the zero lower bound and are in danger of being in a liquidity trap.
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With regard to the results presented in Table 1 , we find even less evidence of a repeated underestimation of the fiscal multiplier as the estimated coefficient is not significant for 2010, 2012 and 2013. However, the results for 2011 clearly resemble the results of the baseline specification, as β slightly exceeds 1 and is significant at the 5% level. Note: the three rows represent the Simple, Quantile and Robust regression of the respective year. *,**, and *** represent the corresponding significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%. 16 We follow Blanchard/Leigh (2013) and define the set of economies in a liquidity trap as those for which the central bank's main nominal policy interest rate reached 1 percent or less during 2010-2013. This definition excludes the following countries from the sample: Iceland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania and Sweden. We find no significant relation between fiscal consolidation forecasts and GDP growth forecasts for the years 2010 and 2013. However, as was the case for the IMF data, we find significant negative values for the year 2011. The coefficients are significant for the three regression type except for the country group "Europe without IMF programs" where only quantile regression yields a significant value.
It is interesting to note that using the database from the EC results in significant positive values of approximately 0,5 for the year 2012 when applying simple regression. These results are however only robust to the quantile and robust regression when estimating the "Europe" country group. These results imply that the forecasters overestimated the effect of fiscal contraction on GDP growth in the year 2012, possibly as a reaction to the underestimation in year 2011.
Overall, we find strong evidence of a negative relationship between fiscal consolidation forecasts and the growth forecast errors for 2011. In this regard, we can confirm the cross section findings of Blanchard/Leigh (2013) . However, we find no evidence that the effects of fiscal consolidation and therefore the fiscal multiplier has been repeatedly underestimated. While we find no evidence for 2012 in the IMF data, the results indicate only weak evidence for 2010 and 2013 which do not appear to be robust to potential outliers and quite sensitive to the country selection. However using the data from the EC results in significant positive values in the year 2012 which might have resulted from a "too rigid" learning or adjustment effect in the forecasts by the EC leading to an overestimation of the effects of fiscal contraction on GDP growth.
Robustness Tests
As a next step, we investigate whether our results are robust to controlling for additional variables. With regard to the omitted variable bias, omission of relevant variables which are positively correlated with fiscal consolidation forecasts and cause lower-than-expected growth might cause a negative bias of our β estimations. Therefore, the omitted variable bias can be 14 considered as an explanation for our findings for 2011. As mentioned in section 2, robustness variables include only information which were available at times forecasts were made. 17, 18 Note: *,**, and *** represent the corresponding significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%.
We first check the results of the country group "Total" of the IMF dataset for robustness. Estimates are reported in Table 3 . There are no significant changes in our simple regression results for 2010 when adding either political stability, external debt or stock market volatility. Controlling for sovereign yields as well as the year-on-year change in sovereign yields, we obtain insignificant estimates for β which are also of smaller magnitude. When including sovereign CDS β is not significant after controlling for potential outliers. The estimated coefficient becomes also insignificant when adding government efficiency as well as unemployment. Adding bank CDS spreads into the framework increases the β-coefficient to a significant value at the 5% percent level of -1,655. The high value may be explained by extreme outliers such as Greece as the robust regression yields a far lower value of -0,688.
The results for 2011 are robust to all additional variables included in our estimation approach, except for including bank CDS spreads. However, estimations including bank CDS spreads have to be interpreted with caution as data is only available for a small amount of countries (see Because of data limitations were can use government gross debt and net debt only as robustness tests for later years.
section 2). All coefficients range around the value of our baseline estimation ( 1,115).
Performing the robust regression also yields significant coefficients for all checks for robustness (excluding bank CDS spreads) with a bigger effect of fiscal consolidation forecasts when adding government efficiency ( 1,318) and stock market volatility ( 1,468).
According to our baseline estimations all checks for robustness result in insignificant coefficients in 2012. The results for 2013 are only robust to including the stability indices from the World Governance stability indicator resulting in insignificant β-coefficients for all other variables contrary to the baseline result which was significant on the 10% level. Adding the stability indicators into the robust regression yields β-coefficients which are significant on the 10% level while the robust regression was insignificant in the baseline regression. As in the simple regression framework, all other variables yield insignificant β-coefficients. Note: *,**, and *** represent the corresponding significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%.
We further check the results for European countries without emerging markets for robustness.
As focusing our analysis on the Euro Area results in few observations we consider concentrating on developed European countries to be a well suited substitution. Table 4 illustrates the results.
The baseline results showed no significant effect of the fiscal consolidation forecast in 2010.
Our checks for robustness confirm this result except for the simple OLS regression including bank CDS spreads. This may be explained by extreme outliers in the bank CDS spreads mentioned above. As was the case in our baseline estimations, all coefficients remain insignificant when checking for robustness.
While all three regressions in our baseline estimations result in significant coefficients for the year 2011 adding bank CDS spreads into the framework produces insignificant values for both the simple and the robust regression. Furthermore, including sovereign CDS spreads and yields into the estimation produces insignificant β-coefficients for the robust estimation in 2011.
In accordance with our baseline estimations presented in Table 1 , all checks for robustness result in insignificant coefficients in 2012. However, the significant β-coefficients for the OLS regression and the robust regression in 2013 cannot be confirmed in our checks for robustness since all values, except for the simple OLS regression including gross government debt yielding a value significant at the 10% level, turn out to be insignificant. Note: *,**, and *** represent the corresponding significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%.
We also apply the same checks for robustness on our results for the EC dataset. Table 5 shows the results when checking the country group "Europe" for robustness. As was the case in the Note: *,**, and *** represent the corresponding significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%.
Checking the country group "Europe without Emerging Economies" for robustness leads to robust results as depicted in Table 6 After controlling for additional variables, we find rather weak evidence that fiscal multipliers have been underestimated for 2010. Especially after the addition of variables which measure sovereign risk, estimates lose their significance compared to our baseline estimations. For 2011, there is still strong evidence that the effects of fiscal contraction have been underestimated.
With regard to our country group "Total", β-estimates remain large and significant even after controlling for additional variables. However, this result appears to be sensitive to the choice of countries in the sample as indicated by the results for country group "Europe without Emerging Economies". Focusing on Core Europe, β coefficients for 2011 become slightly smaller and less significant after controlling for sovereign risk. This generates some support for the thesis that sovereign risk perception can at least partly explain the findings of Blanchard/Leigh (2013) .
Once again, we find no evidence that forecasters have systematically underestimated the effects of fiscal contractions for 2012 and 2013 when using the IMF dataset. We again find evidence for a possible overestimation of the fiscal multiplier in the year 2012 by the EC forecasts.
Panel Estimations 4.1 Main findings
As cross section analysis only allows to examine the effects of fiscal consolidation forecasts for a specific year, panel data analysis appears to be a natural extension of our research. One advantage of using panel data estimations is the large increase in the number of observations.
With respect to the key aspect of this paper, using fixed-effects estimations allows to control for time-invariant heterogeneity between countries (α ) which might affect the estimation of β. Each estimation includes a vector of time-fixed effects . Once again, we use different country groups in order to check whether results are sensitive to the choice of economies in the sample.
In this regard, we use the same country groups as in the cross section analysis. In accordance with equation (1) Table 7 presents the results of our baseline panel estimations using forecasts made by the IMF.
Using the total amount of countries available in our data set, we find that the effect of fiscal consolidation forecast on the growth forecast error is -0,380 and is highly significant for the Note: All regressions have been estimated with included time-dummies. *,**, and *** represent the corresponding significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%.
The results of our estimation approach using forecasts made by the EC are presented in Table   8 . Compared to our previous findings utilizing IMF data, we find that the effect of fiscal con- With respect to the estimations using both sources of forecasts, we once again find strong evi- 
Robustness Tests
Corresponding to our Cross Section analysis, we check our findings for robustness by including nearly the same additional variable as before. In this regard, the entire set of countries is first used for both sources of forecasts.
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CDS spreads which suggests a strong effect of financial market risks on GDP forecasts. However, if we include stock market volatility into our regression framework the coefficient remains significant. With regard to estimates including bank CDS as additional variable, results have to be interpreted with caution as the data availability is pretty low. Our results for the time period 2010 -2011 are robust to all variables included and yield significant β-coefficients at the 10% level for all controls for robustness. Table 9 : Fixed Effects Robustness Check Note: All regressions have been estimated with included time-dummies. *,**, and *** represent the corresponding significance levels 10%, 5% and 1%.
Examining the robustness for our estimations using forecasts of the European Commission, the inclusion of additional variables does not change our baseline results in general for the time period of 2010-2013 as well as the results for our subsample 2010-2011. However, the inclusion of the financial variables "Bank CDS" and "Stock Volatility" render our estimation insignificant. In this regard, after the inclusion of variables measuring financial stress as well as stress in stock markets, we do not find signs of an underestimation of fiscal effectiveness for the EC Country Group "Total" (IMF)
forecasts anymore. However, as mentioned before, the results regarding the inclusion of the variable "Bank CDS" has to be interpreted with caution due to low data availability. 2010 -2013 2010-2011 2010 -2013 2010-2011 Table 7 . With regard to forecasts of the EC the picture is less clear. We find some evidence that forecasts of the EC did underestimate fiscal multipliers for the years of 2010-2011. However, these results do not appear to be robust after accounting for stress in the stock markets. Interestingly, we find evidence for both IMF as well as EC forecasts that these results may also be sensitive to the set of countries. In this regard, countries under IMF programs which largely correspond to countries being heavily affected by the European sovereign debt crisis appear to be driving our results.
Conclusion
Summing up our results, we find strong evidence that IMF forecast have underestimated fiscal multipliers for 2011. This interpretation is based on the cross section as well as panel analysis.
Furthermore, the estimated β-coefficients for 2011 appear to be largely robust with regard to potential outliers as well as the inclusion of additional variables. However, our cross section estimations reveal some evidence for Core Europe that the underestimation of fiscal multipliers decreases when we account for developments in the perception of sovereign risk. What do our results imply for forecasts and fiscal policy? As we find evidence that the underestimation of fiscal multipliers has decreased over time, this might indicate learning effects of forecasters with regard to the effectiveness of fiscal policy for this specific period of time. In contrast to interpreting the results as learning effects of forecasters, fiscal multipliers may have simply decreased after 2011. As our results do not comprise estimations of the actual fiscal multipliers, this question cannot be answered for good. With regard to the question about the "correct" stance of fiscal policy, our results have to be interpreted with caution. A larger than assumed fiscal multiplier does not necessarily present evidence that austerity is the wrong fiscal approach with respect to the current economic environment. It only suggests that growth forecasts were at least too optimistic for 2011.
